The deterrent effectiveness of severe punitive penalties against crime is very limited and in any case should play a secondary role in a wide range of preventive regulatory strategies. John Braithwaite, the distinguished Australian criminologist and member of the Scientific Council of the "Federico Stella" Graduate School of Criminal Justice at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, who was awarded the Balzan Prize this year for his work in the field of restorative justice, also recently reminded us of this.
The fact that this truth, supported by numerous empirical studies, is mostly contradicted in legislative practice, not only but certainly particularly in our country, brings to light a serious problem, not only of the government of public policies, but above all of culture. It is in fact the entire culture of an era and a community that is reflected in criminal justice and, therefore, in the conception of whether, how and how much punishment should and can be used to respond to common problems. Hence the changing features of criminal law, both in the books and in action, constitute – for those who know how to interpret them also in this sense – a faithful seismograph of vast ethical-social upheavals and fractures, only apparently extraneous to what happens in the courtrooms, inside the walls of a prison or in the legislative offices intent on writing new incriminating norms to be poured into the legal system.
The extension of the penal field can be considered inversely proportional to how much a society is able or willing to draw on (and, even before that, to feed it) its resources of intelligence and knowledge: a deposit of inestimable value, whose capacity varies according to the eras and historical-political contingencies, being correlated with that human development that for several years has been measured in different countries with a special "index" (HDI).
This figure is significantly affected by the level of education widespread in a society, which is also determined on the basis of the average schooling of its members. Moreover, the intensity and depth of the "draft" in such a more or less abundant cognitive basin depends very much on the ethical and cultural complexity of public decision-makers, in the broadest sense with which they can be understood. And perhaps above all from that supreme moral good which is the capacity for attention, if it is true, as Simone Weil wrote, that the formation of this inestimable gift should be "the true objective and almost the only interest of studies", "even if today it seems to be ignored". What is needed, for individuals and collectives, is at least the "power of attention" which, as for the "Good Samaritan", "is barely sufficient" for a man "to simply look at that little inert and naked flesh on the side of a road". A power that, however, requires a lot of faith in the truth and the trust of being able to approach it with the commitment to broaden one's knowledge and ability to understand others, our neighbor.
The heritage of "attentional" resources of a community, for that stringent practical-cultural circuit already mentioned that captivates the penal experience to the surrounding worlds, is well revealed by the order in which the punitive response presents itself to the mind and then translates into the acts of the institutional subjects, first and foremost the legislator. We could say that too early a punitive reactivity is an indication of a primitive and underdeveloped thought, if not also of a weak moral temperament, scarcely inclined to "simply look at what little inert and naked flesh on the side of the road". And not only the "flesh" of those who will suffer the rigors of superfluous or exaggerated penalties on their bodies (and already of the trial, whether it leads to conviction or not), but also of potential victims, who from the easy writing in a few lines of the legal system of new crimes or harsher penalties may feel very little protected, especially in the absence of that reasoned punitive and regulatory mix recommended by Braithwaite.
From this point of view, the old and new Italian legislator does not exhibit comforting credentials. Let's remember the "remedy" for massacres in road traffic, conceived in 2016 in the form of very severe penalties for homicide and road injuries. A measure that does not seem to have affected the number and severity of accidents in the slightest. And, to follow, the flow of new incriminating cases and harsher penalties – such as the provision by decree law of the new so-called anti-rave crime, the criminalization of the condition in itself of illegal immigrant, the elevation of surrogacy to a "universal crime", etc. – with both recurring and improvised "security packages". But there are only a few among the countless examples of legislation in which the limelight given to the harsh repressive mask of the State overshadows the omissions of interventions, which would be more decisive because they are thoughtfully attentive to countering the true and composite causes of socially harmful phenomena.
When, in 2014, Pope Francis, addressing the International Association of Penal Law, called for caution in poena and beware of penal populism, he redeclined in moral and civil terms the wise human vision expressed many years earlier, for example, by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson. Especially when he had complained that our societies seemed to prefer prohibitions to positive needs, legislating against usurping variables instead of "encouraging people to be aware of their freedoms and flexibility and to use them more often". To cultivate and use more often, we could add, their attention span.
(the image is the cover of Gabrio Forti's book Il tempo della parola giusta, edited by Matteo Caputo and Arianna Visconti)